Year 2010 in retrospect
The year 2010 appears to have left some historical climate footprints including being a particularly controversial one for climate change negotiations. Report has it that, year 2010 was one of the three warmest years since recorded time in 1850 as it also marked the end of the warmest 10-year period since records began! Indeed, according to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 'The most extreme warm anomalies...extended across most of Canada and Greenland with mean annual temperatures of 3 degrees Celsius or more above normal in parts of west Greenland, the eastern Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic'.
The climate continued dishing out it's warning signals in other parts of the globe as record temperatures are said to have been experienced in Russia (7.6 Celsius above normal) resulting in raging fires that engulfed almost half of that country. With record floods engulfing Pakistan, the Northern region of Nigeria and mudslides swallowing villages in China, the climate was showing no mercy. More still, the winters in Europe and America were record breaking as some parts of Britain also witnessed the coldest Christmas since recorded time. Did I hear some one say but I thought climate change was all about rising temperatures? Be not deceived! Climate change actually leads to extreme temperatures.
The Cancun Climate Change Summit
In an article COP-16: The case for a binding instrument in a post- Kyoto Climate Regime I examined the prospects and challenges that the international community would encounter in seeking to achieve a deal on an instrument to succeed the Kyoto Protocol as the international climate 'grund norm'. With the convergence of negotiators from all corners of the globe, the stakes were high and climate change was once again on the table. So what did COP 16 achieve? How does the agreement in Cancun Mexico further the goal of the international community in finalising a deal on how to tackle climate change? Is there any room for the hope of having a binding instrument when the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012?
A Shared Vision
The Agreement (Draft decision -/CP.16 ), begins by affirming that 'climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and that all Parties share a vision for long-term cooperative action in order to achieve the objective of' tackling climate change, 'on the basis of equity and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. It is agreed that 'this vision is to guide the policies and actions of all Parties, while taking into full consideration the different circumstances of Parties in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention' (see para. 1). Thus, the Agreement lives no one in doubt that the basis upon which international co-operation can be achieved in addressing the global problem of climate is through a common but differentiated responsibility of states. This is commendable, as the differences in vulnerability to it, historical and current culpability, technological and financial capabilities justify this. However, a major short coming is that the expression 'common but differentiated responsibility is not defined. This can be a potential source of controversy as it has in the past, when it comes to interpretation and application.
In line with the principle of CBDR as set out above, it is further agreed 'that Parties should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries, and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-carbon development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development' (see para. 6). This is a tacit recognition that developed countries are to take a leadership role in the mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and that developing countries have a right to also develop economically as this necessitates emission of GHGs. In addition, it is confirmed that 'Parties, especially developing country Parties that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden' as a result of international actions to address climate change, should be given priority (see para. 9). This is an attempt to ensure that the principles of equity and fairness are taking into account as the world tackles it's most challenging contemporary problem.
Finance, technology and capacity-building
The Agreement acknowledges that in the short-term it would be 'the collective commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional resources..., approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation' it advises that funding for adaptation should be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, like the least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa (see para. 95). Also in the long-term, the Agreement recognises 'that developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries' (see para. 98). Hence, it is the exclusive financial responsibility of developed countries to fund adaptation and mitigation activities, as developing countries especially the least developed ones and those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change would remain the primary beneficiaries. Read paragraphs 102-111 to appreciate the establishment of the Green climate fund which would be responsible for the financial management of climate funds.
Under paragraphs 113 to 137 the Agreements outlines and details the procedure to ensure the transfer of green technologies to developing countries by the developed ones, even as the same developed countries are encouraged to enhance capacity-building in terms of adaptation programmes in developing countries. Parties are enjoined to ensure the use of climate friendly technology 'consistent with their respective capabilities and national circumstances and priorities, to undertake domestic actions identified through country-driven approaches, to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperative activities on technology development and transfer and to increase private and public research, development and demonstration in relation to technology for mitigation and adaptation' (para. 116). There is a lot of emphasis on the need for co-operation, to facilitate technology transfer, this is so because even as developed countries bear the ultimate responsibility for funding, transfer of technology and capacity-building, developing countries will have to be co-operative to make this happen.
The other problem relates to the legal effect of this so-called Agreement. Firstly, when can a state (presumably developed) be deemed duty bound to make provisions for either funds, technology or to provide capacity-building under the Agreement? Conversely, how can a state (presumably developing or least developed) trigger the transfer of funds, technology transfer or capacity-building to itself? If a state refuses to comply to any of it's obligations as outlined in the Agreement what will be the consequences? To me, the answers are blowing in the wind! It appears all hopes are now on Durban South Africa. Will COP 17 provide the answers to these burning questions? Only time will tell.
Under paragraphs 113 to 137 the Agreements outlines and details the procedure to ensure the transfer of green technologies to developing countries by the developed ones, even as the same developed countries are encouraged to enhance capacity-building in terms of adaptation programmes in developing countries. Parties are enjoined to ensure the use of climate friendly technology 'consistent with their respective capabilities and national circumstances and priorities, to undertake domestic actions identified through country-driven approaches, to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperative activities on technology development and transfer and to increase private and public research, development and demonstration in relation to technology for mitigation and adaptation' (para. 116). There is a lot of emphasis on the need for co-operation, to facilitate technology transfer, this is so because even as developed countries bear the ultimate responsibility for funding, transfer of technology and capacity-building, developing countries will have to be co-operative to make this happen.
Shortcomings
The Cancun Agreement is an improvement on the Copenhagen Accord for a couple of reasons: Without prejudice to the some of the positives highlighted earlier, it is obvious that while Copenhagen produced a mere 12 paragraphed document, the outcome of the Cancun summit is more comprehensive (147 paragraphs). Secondly, while the Copenhagen Accord is a political declaration by world leaders, the Cancun Agreement is a product of professional climate change negotiators. That notwithstanding, a number of shortcomings are inherent as I examine below.
The Cancun Agreement continues to use the expressions 'developed', 'developing', and 'least developed' without defining these terms. Thus, it remains unclear in the context of climate change what these expressions mean. This problem becomes more compounded when you consider that under the Agreement some states will be beneficiaries of the climate fund, technology transfer and capacity building, while others will remain benefactors. For example, can a country like Saudi Arabia- a relatively wealthy country be said to be a developing country and so entitled to claim benefits just like Somalia? What is the criteria for categorising a country as 'developed', 'developing' or indeed 'least developed'? Is it possible for states to transit from being 'developing' or 'least developed' to 'developed'? Can a 'developed' state ever become a beneficiary should it's economic and technological circumstances change to the negative? If so how? These questions remain unanswered as they have in the current climate instruments.
The other problem relates to the legal effect of this so-called Agreement. Firstly, when can a state (presumably developed) be deemed duty bound to make provisions for either funds, technology or to provide capacity-building under the Agreement? Conversely, how can a state (presumably developing or least developed) trigger the transfer of funds, technology transfer or capacity-building to itself? If a state refuses to comply to any of it's obligations as outlined in the Agreement what will be the consequences? To me, the answers are blowing in the wind! It appears all hopes are now on Durban South Africa. Will COP 17 provide the answers to these burning questions? Only time will tell.
